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 Since the 1660’s the scientific method has included reproducibility 
as a mainstay in its effort to root error from scientific discovery. With the 
explosive growth of digitization in scientific research and communication, 
it is easier than ever to satisfy this requirement. In computational research 
experimental details and methods can be recorded in code and scripts, 
data is digital, papers are frequently online, and the result is the potential 
for “really reproducible research.”1 Imagine the ability to routinely 
inspect code and data and recreate others’ results: Every step taken to 
achieve the findings can potentially be transparent. Now imagine anyone 
with an Internet connection and the capability of running the code being 
able to do this. 
 This paper investigates the obstacles blocking the sharing of code 
and data to understand conditions under which computational scientists 
reveal their full research compendium. A survey of registrants at a top 
machine learning conference (NIPS) was used to discover the strength of 
underlying factors that affect the decision to reveal code, data, and ideas. 
Sharing of code and data is becoming more common as about a third of 
respondents post some on their websites, and about 85% self report to 
have some code or data publicly available on the web. Contrary to 
theoretical expectations, the decision to share work is grounded in 
communitarian norms, although when work remains hidden private 
incentives dominate the decision. We find that code, data, and ideas are 
each regarded differently in terms of how they are revealed and that 
guidance from scientific norms varies with pervasiveness of computation 
in the field. The largest barriers to sharing are time involved in 
preparation of work and the legal Intellectual Property framework 
scientists face. 
 This paper does two things. It provides evidence in the debate 
about whether scientists’ research revealing behavior is wholly governed 
by considerations of personal impact or whether the reasoning behind the 
revealing decision involves larger scientific ideals, and secondly, this 
research describes the actual sharing behavior in the Machine Learning 
community. 
                                                
1 See J. Claerbout, http://sepwww.stanford.edu/sep/jon/reproducible.html 




As scientific computing becomes increasingly central to the modern scientific 
enterprise, standards on openness and verifiability have not kept pace with standards for 
reproducibility of results. This paper surveys computational scientists to understand the 
factors that underlie their decisions to share or not share code and data on the Internet. 
The investigation is built on three pillars of intellectual work, but the underlying interest 
is expressed with this comment from a survey respondent, “my opinion:  if it's not 
open and verifiable by others, it's not science, or engineering, or 
whatever it is you call what we do.” 
Sociological research predicts that scientists will act in self-interested ways with 
regard to exposing their work. This survey provides evidence that scientists’ decisions to 
share are most typically motivated by higher ideals such as concern for scientific 
advancement and the encouragement of sharing in the research community generally. The 
survey confirms conclusions from the literature regarding the free revealing of 
information in industry: that even proprietary knowledge is shared among competitors in 
the spirit of generalized reciprocity. We also found that legal barriers deriving from 
Intellectual Property law place highly as factors that prevent sharing. 
The paper is constructed from a sociological point of view: the digitization of 
science combined with the Internet create a new transparency in scientific knowledge, 
potentially moving scientific progress from building with black boxes, to one where the 
boxes themselves remain wholly transparent. Science of course has not always been 
open. After mathematician Ramanujan’s death his collected works were published in1927 
and “the floodgates opened” with a rush of subsequent publications, building on 
Ramanujan’s newly released work. (Kanigel 1991, p337). Before this publication his 
work was kept secret and meted out through filters such as co-authorship with western 
mathematical luminaries such as G. H. Hardy, who had access to his work.2 Scientific 
communication is at a new juncture of transparency and reproducibility. 
                                                
2 Atle Selberg, one of the world’s most famous number theoreticians credits seeing Ramanujan’s 
Collected Works with giving him the impetus for his own mathematical work. There is no way to tell, but 
because Ramanujan’s work was revealed after his untimely death, perhaps more research was engendered 
than if he had actually lived, and his work remained relatively cloistered for a longer period of time. (See 
Kanigel, p338)  
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TRANSPARENCY IN SCIENTIFIC REASONING AND REPRODUCIBILITY 
 
 Openness and the sharing of scientific reasoning are long established norms 
within the scientific community, and a vital part of the process of evolving a finding to an 
accepted fact. Two threads in the literature have addressed incentives scientists face in 
deciding to reveal aspects of their work. The first is grounded in the study of the 
sociology of science and incentives regarding replication, and the second in the nature of 
revealing of proprietary information between firms. The scientific setting differs from the 
industrial setting, but understanding the influences acting on decisions to reveal 
proprietary information by competing firms gives structure to a fruitful inquiry into the 
sharing of research in the scientific context. 
 Merton (1942) was one of the first to study the mechanisms by which society’s 
stock of scientific knowledge is created, defining a scientist as one who follows ‘the 
ethos of science,’ comprised of four norms, repeated below for convenience: 
 
1. Communism. Property rights only extend to the naming of scientific discoveries 
(Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, for example). All other intellectual property 
rights are given up in exchange for recognition and esteem; 
2. Universalism. Scientific discoveries must conform with previously confirmed 
knowledge and are evaluated in terms of universal or impersonal criteria, not on a 
subjective basis such as class, gender, religion, race, nationality, or affiliation; 
3. Disinterestedness. Scientists must appear to act in ways that are selfless in their 
pursuit of claims to truth, thereby ensuring integrity in the research process and 
reducing fraud; 
4. Organized Skepticism. Scientists are critical: All ideas must be tested and are 
subject to rigorous structured community scrutiny. 
 
In Merton’s model, voluntary sharing of methods, results, and scholarship is implied: 
“Communism” suggests scientists not create property rights and instead give their work 
over to the community; the selflessness inherent in “Disinterestedness” implies a social 
aspect to scientific investigation evident in both sharing and transparency; and 
“Organized Skepticism” suggests sharing by requiring results and ideas to be subject to 
verification by the community. These objects of scholarship are not seen by Merton to 
belong to the individual scientist but to the larger community. David (2003) observed that 
the full disclosure of findings and methods actually prescribes the Organized Skepticism 
norm, since it creates an expectation that claims to truth contributing to the stock of 
knowledge will have been subject to “trials of verification.” (p3). Polanyi (1962) 
supported Merton’s characterization of scientists as a community of independent men and 
women freely cooperating, calling it “a highly simplified example of a free society.” 
Kuhn (1962) proposes an alternative to Merton’s norm-based scientific organization by 
suggesting that scientists follow a pre-established paradigm dictating what problems are 
to be investigated, which creates a guide to appropriate future research. Scientists’ current 
practices may or may not conform to the established rules of the scientific method, in that 
previously established results are taken for granted as building blocks for their own 
discovery work, such as the solving of concrete problems.  
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 Bourdieu (2002) argues change comes from innovators confronting the defenders 
of the paradigm, where these innovators may draw intellectual strength from societal 
currents outside the scientific community. (p15). According to Bourdieu disputes are 
settled though strength of capital: scientific, symbolic, and social capital, used to exert 
pressure to enforce conformity with this particular researcher’s views.3 This is how others 
are convinced of the truth and, according to Bourdieu, how truth is established. For 
Bourdieu, scientific behavior is defined by those trying to maximize the amount of those 
forms of capital in their possession. Merton’s norms of cooperation and disclosure, 
coupled with the verification of results create an “incentive compatibility” according to 
David (2003), in that these two norms self-reinforce and imply each other. This behavior 
is also encouraged by science’s “reputation-based reward system grounded upon 
validated claims to priority in discovery or invention” which requires voluntary openness 
and sharing of scientific results, including sufficient information that they can be 
validated by the scientific community (p4). 
 Merton (1949) introduced the concept of ‘obliteration by incorporation’ to 
describe sharing in the sciences: A concept becomes so popularized that its inventor is 
forgotten, no longer cited, and the idea is considered common knowledge. Merton 
himself contributed a number of these when he coined phrases in our regular lexicon such 
as “self-fulfilling prophecy” (1968) and “unintended consequences” (1936). Facts are 
artificial in the sense that they are manufactured: “a fact is nothing but a statement with . . 
. no trace of authorship.” (Latour and Woolgar 1979: 82). The steps taken to establish this 
fact are forgotten: the traces of research, the disputes and negotiations between research 
groups. Latour (1987) takes this idea further when he describes scientific progress as the 
construction of “black boxes,” meaning that successful scientific discoveries are those 
that are identified by a shorthand name and survive without citation or authorship 
attribution.4 Latour proposes the mechanism of the “black box” as both an explanation for 
the progress of scientific research, and as a method of resolving disputes. A “black box” 
is a term used to describe a complex set of commands, machinery, or a methodology 
underlying a result, that is too intricate to be represented by its full description, and for 
which only the inputs and the outputs need to be known.  
Latour’s black boxes are created when agreement on new knowledge is 
established and the uncertainty inherent in the process of discovery is removed to an 
outside observer. In his theory this is an essential mechanism for scientific progress, since 
it allows for the modularization of scientific knowledge and enables new ideas to be built 
upon the old. A black box is costly and difficult to open since this implies questioning 
results and understanding how they came to be. Thus this system of black box creation 
discourages dissent and questioning of results. According to Latour, science proceeds as 
an effort to close black boxes which, in turn, have been built upon previous black boxes. 
                                                
3 Scientific capital is that which augments a scientist’s ability to make scientific achievements, 
specifically the ability to get his or her arguments noticed, such as standing in his or her field, prestige, or 
resources. Social capital refers to the strength of relationships the scientists has managed to develop within 
his or her field through which he or she can mobilize power and resources. Symbolic capital refers to that 
which a scientist can use to advance his or her interests, and maximize his or her symbolic profit, in 
particular his or her scientific authority.  
4 This is slightly different to Merton’s formulation where, in Communism, he asserts that scientists give 
up property rights over discoveries with the exception of names. Theorems and factual discoveries are 
permitted to be named after people without violation of the Communism norm.  
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 Barnes & Bloor (1982) suggest that scientific theories can never be determined or 
confirmed by data, given that several theories can point to the same data. Thus, consensus 
is fragile and controversies are often not resolved by the evidence but come to an end in 
any event, by other means. Collins and Pinch (1998) have found that when scientists 
replicate others’ work, they tend not to do so exactly, but subvert the previous procedure 
for their own ends/programs.5 Bourdieu postulates that this may be due to the opacity of 
the methodology in published papers (p20). He also suggests that scientific papers 
conform to specific norms for written presentation of results rather than describe what 
actually happened, and scientists can repeatedly get good results without explaining how. 
This is a manifestation of Polanyi’s concept of “Tacit Knowledge:” Some elements of 
what we do aren’t reducible to a series of instructions and thus are impossible to share, 
even though they may be vital to understanding the scientific experiment and results. As 
an example he asks readers try explaining how to ride a bike through instruction alone 
(p.). “Scientific research – in short – is an art” (1951; 57). 
In the words of Bourdieu, Collins and Pinch directly contradict Merton’s 
Universalism norm by suggesting both negotiations regarding fact creation and 
acceptance of results revolve around “judgments about questions of personal honesty, 
technical competence, institutional affiliation, style of presentation and nationality.” And, 
“[i]n short, Popperian falsification gives an idealized image of the solutions provided by 
the ‘core set’ of scientists in the course of their disputes.” (p20).6 Polanyi (1951) gives an 
instructive analogy for understanding the organization of scientists. He imagines a group 
of workers trying to assemble a large jigsaw puzzle (p35). Each worker alone may have a 
few pieces, but cannot see how they fit into the overall puzzle. Polanyi suggests scientific 
research is an efficient solution to this problem in that it provides a way for each worker 
to keep track of what the other workers are doing in their jigsaw puzzle assembling work. 
Due to the openness inherent in scientific research, when someone fits in a piece of the 
puzzle, the others can watch and see the next steps that become possible. Each worker 
acts on his or her own initiative, and according to private interests, but helps to further the 
entire group. Polanyi suggests that when new research avenues are created, scientists 
become aware of them via perfectly open communication, and decide to work on areas 
that maximize their intellectual and emotional reward. Polanyi (1951) suggests that the 
freedom to pursue truth, acquire knowledge for it’s own sake, and react to claims made 
by peers is a prerequisite for contributions to society’s stock of knowledge (p40, 69). He 
envisions scientists as community members bound by a commitment to truth, what he 
termed “The Republic of Science,” and exhibiting behavior resembling that of a free 
market for truth, rather than profit. Hagstrom (1965) states that scientists give each other 
new information that he or she has discovered, to receive recognition for those 
discoveries in return (p16-22).  
“"Replicability... is the Supreme Court of the scientific system. In the scientific 
value system replicability symolizes the indiference of science to race, creed, class, 
                                                
5 Collins also develops the concept of “experimenter’s regress,” that each replication, or attempt at 
confirmation of results, requires a further experiment to confirm it and so on ad infinitum. Collins, 
Changing Order, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p2. 
6 Popperian falsification itself is questioned by the Duhem-Quine critique: that empirical falsification is 
ambiguous. Ie. one cannot be sure that the theory has been falsified, rather than another aspect of the 
experimental setup. 
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colour and so forth. It corresponds to what the sociologist Robert Merton (1945) called 
the 'norm of universality''. Anybody, irrespective of who or what they are, in principle 
ought to be able to check for themselves through their own experiments that a scientific 
claim is valid.” (Collins 1985). Collins discusses several case studies in replication of 
scientific results, building a case that this aspect of scientific practice is highly culturally 
influenced, rather than a straightforward implementation of Merton’s norms. 
“Repeatability...is the touchstone of common sense philosophy of science. .. It is crucial 
to separate the simple idea of repeatability from the complexities of its practical 
accomplishment.” (p18-19). He chooses examples that represent Kuhn’s three phases of 
science, the revolutionary, extraordinary, and normal phases (1962), showing how 
replication is nearly impossible in practice, in non-computational science. The rules of 
the game have changed with the increased use of computational tools in science, that 
afford, in theory, precise replication of published results by independent parties. This 
focus of this paper is on error checking and the transmission of the scientific knowledge 
underlying computational results, such that they may be verified, not with the extension 
of our body of scientific knowledge through the testing of previous results that therefore 
“must be neither exactly the same nor too different.” (Collins p 34) 
In modeling information sharing in scientific research Fröhlich (1998) postulates 
that scientists strategically hold back information from peers in their field, group, or 
laboratory, in their publications, and at conferences. He suggests that this behavior is not 
the exception, but a prevalent practice. Fröhlich describes three principles of scientific 
communication, countering Merton’s four norms of scientific behavior (p541): 
 
1. Communicate informally just as much as absolutely necessary to keep 
scientific groups functional; 
2. Publish the minimum needed to preserve one’s claim for priority on the 
findings; 
3. Publish as little information of practical use as possible to prevent giving 
competitors a competitive advantages. 
 
Information that could be withheld could be experimental details, particularly specialized 
local knowledge about the methodology. Fröhlich also suggests that scientific jargon is 
an attempt to frustrate efforts of other scientists seeking to gain knowledge and thus 
advantage from the work (p540). David (2003) describes the output of scientific research 
as a public good, and notes that public goods create an incentive to “free-ride” on the co-
operative actions of others (p3). David notes that even with this temptation, the fact that 
the system has survived in tact indicates that scientists must still find a greater reward in 
sharing, despite the potential for free-riding. 
 This discussion suggests that individual scientists are rational actors and will only 
freely reveal if it is in their best interest, as they see it. But “best interest” can be 
evaluated in several ways. If a scientist is rewarded by an increase in capital in any form, 
such as public recognition (Bourdieu) or claims on priority (Fröhlich), then there is an 
incentive to freely reveal. If free revealing hastens the closure of a black box, then again 
there is a reason for the scientist to freely reveal (Latour).7 If sharing allows a scientist to 
                                                
7 This can be interpreted as a restatement of an accrual of capital if scientists are publicly recognized 
for black box closure, and it can also be interpreted in Fröhlich’s framework if the creation of a black box is 
8 Knowledge in the “Republic of Science” [9-Feb-10 
 
advance his or her work, by participating in a community that shares, then there is an 
incentive to reveal (Polyani). The work of Polanyi gives a second rationale for black box 
closure and the withholding of experimental or methodological details: That it is 
impossible to transmit details of the work that are “tacit.” 
In Latour’s model the creation of black boxes is an epistemological strategy for 
the construction of new knowledge. Latour insists this cannot be done by one person in a 
vacuum, but that a new fact is a collective object and others must be marshaled in 
support, bringing to mind Bourdieu’s description of science as the accumulation of social, 
scientific and symbolic capital. The black box has typically been difficult to reopen: 
involving a re-examination of the methodology that led to the results and a possible re-
opening of any controversies that were involved with the original experiment, or the 
generation of new controversies. Within each black box are, necessarily, many further 
black boxes that need to be unpacked, questioned, and understood. Indeed, in Latour’s 
world scientists have an incentive to make the black box as difficult to open as possible 
since on a macro level it is no longer a useful building block in further research if opened, 
and on an individual level one’s own results being re-questioned removes the reputational 
reward for research. With the sharing mechanism of the Internet, scientists now have the 
option of not sealing the black box, even keeping it transparent. 
 Borgman (p196; 2007), focusing on the role of data sharing in scientific 
scholarship, directly suggests four reasons scientists may fail to reveal their data: 1) 
insufficient perceived reward, such as promotion or subsequent citation, 2) effort in 
documenting, 3) concerns for priority, including control of results and sources, and 4) 
intellectual property issues. Borgman suggests a sense of ownership over data can lead to 
the creation of bargaining power for scientists against those who may want to see the 
data.  Freely revealing data would erode this advantage over other scientists. What is 
unclear, Borgman continues, is the true nature of ownership of data when a diverse group 
of funders, scientists, and collaborators have contributed to its creation. This latter point 
was reflected in at least one comment by a survey respondent, “Intellectual property 
is usually a major consideration. It is unusual for me to have complete 
and sole ownership of a data set. Good data is so difficult to collect 
that there are inevitably other people and organizations involved.” 
Concerning this point, Stodden (2009) addresses IP issues scientists are subject to in the 
U.S. as well as typical funding requirements that data be made available to the public. 
Supporting Borgman’s description of data ownership, another respondent commented 
that “the data (e.g., from animals) is hard to collect, and even harder 
to fully document and standardize. Thus data becomes a bargaining 
token. For theoreticians, it means dibs on new data and a say in new 
experimental design; for experimentalists it means much more visibility 
for their data/experimental paradigm, and an opportunity to more 
thoroughly investigate the problem area. Plus an opportunity to make 
sure that their interpretation/worldview gets solid representation.” 
 Borgman’s four factors can be applied to the code component of the research as 
well as to the data component, with the exception that code and data each fall under a 
different Intellectual Property structure. Code is typically copyrightable by default, where 
                                                
either an assurance of the scientist’s claims on priority or a method of obscuring information to prevent 
advantaging other scientists. 
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the raw facts encased in a dataset are not. There may not be sufficient rewards for 
revealing code, for taking the time to document it for release, and sharing may engender a 
loss of control over priority in future work, just as Borgman articulates in the case of 
data. Effort in documentation was broken down by a survey respondent into three parts, 
“The time to find a place to put the code, or write the web page -- I 
guess it comes under documentation, but there are 3 time factors: (1) 
setting up or finding a platform, (2) explaining how to use or run the 
code and (3) internal documentation within the code.” 
Allen (1983), first reporting free revealing in industry and labeling it “collective 
invention,” found three factors he used to explain why this was successful in blast 
furnace design in nineteenth century England. First, he showed that a solid technical 
understanding of the blast furnace was lacking, and thus performance uncertain and 
previous experience valuable; second, reputation was augmented for those who shared 
useful information; and thirdly, despite revealing, blast furnace owners still made 
economic gains from their innovations, although they were diffuse in that they benefited 
other firms as well since the value of iron ore was increased through the technological 
improvements. Aside from directly realized profit, an increase in firm reputation 
motivated the sharing of proprietary information both informally and formally in 
professional societies and through publication in technical journals by employees of 
competing firms. Scientific research, especially when analogized as a process of puzzle 
completion by Polanyi, bears a striking resemblance to Allen’s setting: scientific 
scholarship centers on problems with no known solutions; reputation is the main mode of 
reward for research and discovery; and a discovery in one area may “spill over” and have 
a positive impact beyond the immediate application for which it was derived. This is 
evident when Polanyi describes the information gained by scientists as they keep track of 
progress on the entire puzzle (their field), even though from their perspective they only 
contribute in an isolated region. A scientist’s reputation may also be increased through 
free revealing by factors beyond citation: high quality elements of the work might come 
to light on the web, which might not have otherwise. Clever code or well-organized data, 
for example, can have the effect of increasing trust and thus reputation (through the 
mechanism of Bourdieu’s scientific capital), in addition to facilitating citation.  
A similar free revealing phenomenon to Allen’s furnace example was found by 
Nuvolari (2004) when he studied nineteenth century Cornish mining. Mine managers 
from competing firms founded a journal, Engine Reporter, to share information on engine 
use for water removal from mines. The two motivations here appear to be different: in 
Allen’s case standing was increased, and thus presumably profitability, through the 
sharing of designs, whereas in Nuvolari’s case sharing seems to have been a rebellious 
reaction to stringent patent enforcement by Watt, inventor of the steam engine. 
Nevertheless, the Engine Reporter permitted attribution and reputational reward for 
innovators publishing in the journal. As in Allen’s case the mine pumping problem was 
not yet fully understood and there were spillover effects in that iron ore became more 
valuable overall as any one mining company improved their technology. Lerner and 
Tirole (2002) and Raymond (1999) studied the conditions for free revealing in the open 
source software context and found that programmers who freely reveal code are similarly 
rewarded by gains in reputation, and possible increases in their value on the job market. 
Raymond also postulates that only a very low level of damage could accrue to the free 
revealing programmer. In a comprehensive survey of coders who participate on the open 
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source website SourceForge.com, Lakhani and Wolf (2005) found that many 
programmers shared their code simply because they enjoyed learning from the coding 
experience. von Hippel and von Krogh (2006) found that being part of a community of 
developers and learning through feedback from peers motivated coders to reveal their 
work. 
 In scientific research there is a norm allowing a commensurate increase in the 
time data can remain sequestered with the difficulty level inherent in its collection. 
Unique data, more likely when the difficulty level is high, is more likely to remain closed 
because of its higher value induced by its monopoly-like status. For example, data 
collected from the Large Hadron Collider requires a series of rules to enforce openness.8 
As Rolf-Dieter Heuer, director general of CERN, explains, “Ten or 20 years ago we 
might have been able to repeat an experiment. They were simpler, cheaper and on a 
smaller scale. Today that is not the case. So if we need to re-evaluate the data we collect 
to test a new theory, or adjust it to a new development, we are going to have to be able 
reuse it. That means we are going to need to save it as open data.…”9 Non-revealers in 
science, as opposed to the open source world, may be acting shrewdly if the disclosure of 
methodology through making code and data public is not required. Scientists who do 
make their entire research compendium available risk having their work inspected more 
closely and perhaps increase the chance of errors being found. 
Being the first to reveal an innovation in industry may have a payoff that 
outweighs any potential loss from revealing freely. For example, being first with a new 
idea or result increases the chances of wider adoption or the establishment of a standard 
around the revealed product. (Harhoff and von Hippel (1985)). This occurs in scientific 
research: Donoho (2002), who was first to freely reveal wavelet research including code 
and data, laments the repeated use of his testbeds for signal processing applications 
beyond those for which they were intended.10 His test cases have become a standard 
benchmark by which to test certain types of algorithms. 
Ekeh (1974: 48) states that generalized norms of reciprocity refer to occasions 
when “an individual feels obligated to reciprocate another's action, not by directly 
rewarding his benefactor, but by benefiting another actor implicated in a social exchange 
situation with his benefactor and himself.” There is an analogy among scientists, if one 
benefits from publicly shared data or code, there is an expectation that modifications are 
subsequently shared. Bouty (2000) reported informal information trading among 
scientists working in the R&D units of firms. She obtained detailed reports of 128 
accomplished and attempted “resource exchanges” by firm scientists with external 
colleagues. In these exchanges, scientists would informally provide information on their 
research and other research-related services to colleagues in competing firms who request 
it. She found that these incidents involved expectations of reciprocity understood both by 
people who give the information and those who receive it. 
Lerner and Tirole (2001) identify several key research questions they felt required 
answering in any study of the Open Source software community (Nuvolari 2005). Two 
                                                
8 See http://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html 
9 Computer Weekly, August 6, 2008. Available at 
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2008/08/06/231762/in-search-of-the-big-bang.htm (last accessed 
July 16, 2009). 
10 See http://www-stat.stanford.edu/~wavelab/ 
9-Feb-10] Knowledge in the “Republic of Science”  11 
 
can be adapted for our context: 
 
1. As a spontaneously provided "pure" public good, scientific research should be 
prone to the free–rider problem; how can research projects encourage the active 
participation of talented investigators? 
2. Research that is fully revealed on the web is subject to default copyright restrictions 
that work against the scientific norms of reproducibility and building upon others; 
work. Can an adjustment of this intellectual property scheme increase the rate of 
discovery in the sciences? 
 
The second question is taken up in (Stodden 2009), which addresses the appropriate 
copyright structure for scientific works released on the web. The first allows us to 
structure our information on industrial sharing to the scientific context. This evidence 
supports our main hypothesis: that scientists share when it pays personally, that is, the 
private gains from sharing behavior outweigh the costs. But we can formulate a more 
precise analysis. The free rider problem is not so clear cut in science as it is in the open 
software community or in industry. In science the only way to free ride is to use another 
scientist’s work without citation or to preclude a publication he or she was poised to 
make.11 Unless publications are precluded, use of another scientist’s materials, properly 
attributed, boosts the reputation of the revealing scientist, rather than siphoning away 
return. The loss to a revealer to free riders is an opportunity cost: the loss of future 
publications or recognition, and the loss of time spent preparing work for release that 
could have been spent otherwise. Scientific research, in terms of code and data, is not 
costly to hide, except in terms of forgone citation from scientists who may have built on 
the work. Data and code usually reside on private machines and of course no effort is 
required to leave them there. 
Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) point out that there may also be pressure for 
programmers to reveal: if they do not contribute their code, someone else could 
contribute code with the same functionality, thereby blocking their contribution. There 
are many examples of scientists racing to publish a result that they fear others might 
report first.12 If priority can be established through code and data releases, establishing 
priority could be a compelling reason to reveal publicly, although typically in scientific 
research priority is gained through publication. 
  
These two threads in the literature reveal two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Sharing occurs because scientists perceive personal gain from doing so, 
through either reputation gains, claims on priority, black box closure, acceleration of the 
research process, encouragement of others to work on the problem, or advantage through 
the establishment of standards, despite the possibility of free-riding. Sharing does not 
                                                
11 I am assuming that the revealed research is not stolen and is used within the scientific norm of giving 
attribution. As mathematician G. H. Hardy said in 1908, “Surely it is obvious that, if I were to make any 
illegitimate use of your results, nothing would be easier than for you to expose me.” (Kanigel, p181). Free 
revealing on the Internet has the convenient property of creating a time stamp of when the revealing took 
place, so subsequent uses of ideas or material released on the web can be easily exposed. 
12 See, for example, Ingrid Daubechies, Ten Lectures on Wavelets, 1992. 
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occur when scientists perceive a personal loss from doing so, such as time taken to 
prepare code and data for release, insufficient rewards, or loss of control over priority on 
derivative works. 
 
This hypothesis describes scientists as concerned only with their immediate self-interest, 
in both their decisions to share and not share their research. From the preceding 
discussion a second hypothesis emerges: scientists view themselves as belonging to a 
community and seek community membership and feedback through sharing their work. 
Seeking feedback can be viewed as satisfying private incentives, in accordance with 
Hypothesis 1, but seeking acceptance in a community can be seen as behavior induced 
from larger communitarian ideals. Being a good community member implies an 
acceptance of and support for the community structure.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The willingness to reveal work reflects a scientist’s desire to belong to a 
community and to gain feedback on his or her work. 
 
Both of the reasons given in Hypothesis 2 address why a scientist may want to share, not 
why he or she may choose to keep work private. In this sense Hypothesis 2 is a subset of 
Hypothesis 1 which makes an assertion about the nature of reasons for both sharing and 
not sharing. These two hypotheses suggest a survey design: measuring the influence of 
factors on the decision to reveal or not reveal code, data, and ideas.  
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SHARING BEHAVIOR 
 
 In surveying “computational scientists” the first step was to define the term. A 
computational scientist is an academic whose research has both code and data 
components. I chose to focus on scientists using computing heavily in their work and 
interacting primarily with other computational scientists, in particular those working in 
the field of machine learning. Examining a representative cross-section of this 
population, from those new to the field to experienced icons, from highly ranked schools 
and smaller departments, and across a variety of fields, would shed the most light on the 
factors underlying sharing. I chose to question researchers registered for one of the 
largest and most prestigious machine learning conferences spanning many different 
fields, the Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS) conference,13 held every 
January in Whistler, British Columbia, Canada.14 
 
A.  The Survey Sample 
 
 NIPS and ICML (International Conference on Machine Learning) are the two 
most prestigious and biggest conferences in the Machine Learning community. An 
important benefit to examining this conference is that part of its focus is on biological 
systems and bioinformatics, giving a wide variety of academic backgrounds in the study. 
Of the program committee for NIPS ’08 about 40% of the 27 members are involved in 
                                                
13 http://nips.cc/ 
14 I was a speaker at NIPS in 2003. See David L. Donoho and Victoria Stodden, “When Does Non-
Negative Matrix Factorization Give a Correct Decomposition into Parts?” NIPS Proceedings, 2003. 
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work that has a biological dimension: genetics, neuroscience, or medical imaging for 
example. Registrants come from a wide variety of departments: mathematics, statistics, 
psychology, neurology, computer science, electrical engineering, linguistics, robotics, 
medicine are all represented for example. 
 Studying one group of conference attendees has compelling advantages. The 
group is coherent in the sense of sharing similarly situated computational research. The 
registrants have common research interests in machine learning and its application in 
computational and biological problems and span a broad range of fields. The NIPS 
registrants vary from master’s student through emeritus professor, and span a large 
number of schools that are geographically diverse and vary widely in terms of size, 
wealth, and prestige. Their common feature is their interest in and success at publishing 
in computational machine learning. 
 Up to and including 2008, there have been 1,758 NIPS registrants. I eliminated 
from the study those without an email address ending in .edu to restrict my research to 
scientists affiliated with American universities and thus under the same Intellectual 
Property legal framework. Doing this also allowed me to study a group with reasonably 
consistent institutional standards regarding expectations and valuation of academic work. 
Restricting the target sample in this way dropped from the survey group both registrants 
who were affiliated with a company and those who provided no email address.15 After 
reducing to .edu email addresses I was left with 1,008 researchers. 
 
B.  Survey Design 
 
The survey was designed to address questions that came to light in both 
interviews and in the two threads in the literature. I conducted pre-pilot interviews to 
solicit input from computational scientists, and ran a pilot survey. The story drawn from 
the sociology and industrial free revealing literature isn’t a complete description of code 
and data sharing for computational scientists. From the pilot and interviews, additional 
reasons underlying the sharing decision included normalizing understanding in a field, 
the time to document code and data, the potential to find collaborators, protection from 
commercial application, publicity, the desire to track use of your work; contentiousness 
of the topic; the number of requests received for the code or data, the amount of effort 
exerted in created the code or data, the impact on future grant funding, and privacy 
concerns with data are all factors that were cited as important to sharing decision making. 
“Table 1: Factors Reflecting Private Incentive” lays out the factors the final survey asked 
participants to rate for influence. The patent system provides a disincentive to reveal code 
since software can be patented and posting code publicly could establish prior art and 
make obtaining the patent more difficult, if not impossible. Accordingly, the survey 
includes factors to measure the influence of the Intellectual Property framework scientists 
are subject to. “Table 1: Factors ” and “Table 2: Factors Reflecting Communitarian 
Ideals” list each of the factors included in the final survey, with its source as discussed 
earlier in the previous section. The factors are divided into those reflecting private 
incentives and those reflecting communitarian ideals, and those that do neither. 
                                                
15 Registrants who gave no email address are unlikely to have had a paper accepted at that conference 
and so helps reduce the survey group to those making publishable contributions to computational science. 
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Table 1: Factors Reflecting Private Incentive 
  Source 
Increase in publicity Hagstrom, Interviews 
The potential to set a standard for the field Harhoff & von Hippel 
Opportunity to get feedback on your work Polanyi, von Krogh, 
Interviews 
The number of requests you receive for the code Schrader 
Being first to release code in this area  Borgman, Interviews 
Impact on future grant applications Pilot Survey 
Whether you put in a large amount of work building the 
code or data 
Interviews 
Requirement for publication Interviews 
Required by research funders Pilot Survey 
Dealing with questions from users about the code or data Schrader 
The time it takes to clean up and document for release Borgman, Interviews 
The time it takes to verify privacy or other administrative 
data concerns (data only) 
Borgman, Interviews 
The potential loss of future publications using this code Interviews 
The possibility that your code may be used without citation  Interviews 
Competitors may get an advantage Von Hippel, Latour, Frohlich, 
Borgman 
 
Table 2: Factors Reflecting Communitarian Ideals 
  Source 
Encouraging scientific advancement Pilot Survey 
Encouraging sharing and having others share with you Ekeh, Bouty 
Being a good community member Polanyi, von Krogh 
Improvement in the caliber of research Pilot Survey 
Normalizing understanding in a field Pilot Survey 
Conforming with the requirements of the scientific method Merton, Pilot Survey 
 
Table 3: Factors Reflecting both Private Incentive and Communitarianism 
  Source 
The potential to set a standard for the field Harhoff & von Hippel 
Potential to encourage others to work on the problem Allen, Interviews 
The topic is receiving a lot of attention Pilot Survey 
Conforming with the usual practices of the research community Polanyi 
Potential to close a line of inquiry and move the research to the next 
step 
Latour, Baldwin 
Whether there is intense competition in the topic Schrader, Allen 
Availability of other code or data that might substitute for your own Schrader 
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The code might be used in commercial applications (code only) Pilot Survey 
The possibility of patents, or other IP constraints (code only) Stodden 
Legal barriers, such as copyright Stodden 
Technical limitations, ie. webspace platform space constraints (pilot)             Pilot Survey 
 
 Respondents were asked to indicate the level of influence of the factors on a scale 
7-point scale ranging from “Very Strong Influence to Share,” through “No Influence” to 
“Very Strong Influence NOT to Share.” As indicated in the tables above, the respondents 
were asked slightly different factors for code and data, because of the differing IP 
structures for each. The order the factors were presented to each participant varied 
randomly, to eliminate any possible biasing effect due to factor ordering. Each 
respondent was asked for any further influencing factors in the event there were other 
reasons they decided to share or not share their most recent NIPS paper. Additional 
questions asked them which components of their research they were comfortable 
revealing on the web, how many potential papers they feel they have had scooped, and to 
estimate the proportion of code or data they have posted on the web. I also asked them for 
further thoughts and whether they are interested in receiving a copy of this paper. (See 
appendix for a copy of the final survey.) 
 
C.  Survey Results 
 
 The final survey was sent in two waves to the remaining 638 scientists in the 
sample, with 37 bounces and 5 away from their mail.16 Three further researchers were 
dropped from the study when their response indicated they were at a firm or in a foreign 
university. The final response rate was 134 of 593 or 23%. I obtained demographic and 
other information for each respondent from his or her website. The distribution of 
characteristics is displayed in “Table 4: Descriptive Characteristics (from Respondent’s 
Website)”. Respondents’ university affiliation was grouped into 5 groups using the U.S. 
News and World Reports ranking for computer science departments for 2008. This is not 
a ideal proxy for prestige since 34% of respondents were not from computer science 
departments. Respondents tend to be early in their career, male, from a computer science 
department. 
Table 4: Descriptive Characteristics (from Respondent’s Website) 
Characteristic Count Proportion 
Position 
 Master’s Student 
 PhD Student 
 Postdoc or Fellow 
 Assistant Professor 



















                                                
16 See http://www.stanford.edu/~vcs/Survey2009/SharingSurvey.html for an example of the webform 
used in the survey. 







 Electrical Engineering or Computer Science 
 Neuroscience, Neurobiology, Biomedical engineering 
 Statistics, Biostatistics, Medical informatics 






 Finance, Operations Research 
 Philosophy 
 
University (by US News CS Department Ranking 2008) 
 MIT, Stanford, Berkeley; CMU; UIUC 
 Cornell, Princeton, U Washington; GATech, UTAustin 
 CalTech, UW-Madison; UCLA, U Maryland, U Michigan 
 Columbia, Harvard, UCSD; Purdue; Brown 
















































 Respondents were asked about their comfort level in sharing their final 
publication, pre and post publication code and data, and ideas pre-publication. “Table 5: 
Research Component Sharing Rates (Survey Results)” reveals unsurprisingly that 
essentially all respondents were willing to post their final paper on the web, but 
surprisingly a strong majority were willing to share their post publication code and data, 
and more seemed willing to share pre-publication code than pre-publication data.17 
Respondents self-reported an average of 32% of their code available on the web, and 
48% of their data, with 81% claiming to reveal some code and 84% claiming to reveal 
some data. 
Table 5: Research Component Sharing Rates (Survey Results) 
Proportion Comfortable Sharing on the Web…  
Final Paper 99% 
Draft Paper 26% 
Pre-publication Data 13% 
Post-publication Data 67% 
Pre-publication Code 21% 
Post-publication Code 74% 
                                                
17 A difference in proportions test applied to the difference in willingness to share prepublication code 
and data was insignificant, with p-value = 0.1929, indicating that there is no difference in willingness to 
share pre-publication code and data (21% and 13% respectively, as shows in Table 5: Research Component 
Sharing Rates (Survey Results)). 
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Unpublished research ideas, ie. through a blog 21% 
 
 From inspecting respondent websites, 30% of respondents shared some code and 
20% shared some data on their own websites. The discrepancy between the self-reporting 
sharing rates and those I compiled is probably due to the fact that much data is available 
in public corpora and may not be directly linked to on the scientist’s homepage. 
Similarly, code may be developed and housed in public repositories which may not be 
linked from the respondent’s webpage. In one respondent’s words, “All papers that I have 
published use corpora that can be licensed from other sources.”18 Of the shared code, half 
had no provision for licensing, and of the licensed half, the majority chose the GPL 
license19 and about a quarter wrote their own license. The remaining respondents chose 
an established license other than the GPL. 
Table 6: Sharing and Licensing (from Respondent’s Website) 
Characteristic Count Proportion 
Code Sharing 
 No License 
 GPL 
 Own license 


















 If Hypothesis 1 holds, we would expect reasons to share and reasons not to share 
to reflect predominantly private incentives, with little regard for larger ideals. This is 
precisely not the case. The factors that influence computational scientists to share their 
code and data are those established as communitarian, but when scientists chose not to 
share their code and data, the decision is ruled by private incentives. “Table 8: 
Comparing Reasons or Sharing Code to Reasons Not to Share” and “Table 7: Comparing 
Reasons for Sharing Data to Reasons Not to Share” show the proportion of respondents 
that cited each factor as a reason to share or a reason not to share. For both code and data, 
reasons not to share a predominantly driven by private incentives (in italics) and reasons 
to share by communitarian norms (in bold). The ordering of the communitarian and non-
communitarian factors is significantly different from random, at the 10% level, for 
sharing both code and data.20 
                                                
18 In this respondent’s case, I did find a link from the webpage to data used in publication. In the 
biosciences, a general requirement is that all relevant data be made available at a publicly accessible 
website (usually an internationally coordinated database) at the time of a paper’s publication (Cech T.R. 
2003 Sharing Publication-Related Data and Materials: Responsibilities of Authorship in the Life Sciences; 
available at www.nap.edu/books/0309088593/html). 
19 See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (last accessed June 19, 2009). 
20 This significance level was obtained using the bootstrap to generate a null-distribution over all factor 
orderings. 
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Encouraging scientific advancement 81.95% 0.75% 
Being a good community member 80.45% 0.00% 
Potential to encourage others to work on the problem 79.70% 2.26% 
Encouraging sharing and having others share with you 78.95% 0.00% 
The potential to set a standard for the field 77.44% 0.00% 
Improvement in the caliber of research 74 44% 0.00% 
Increase in publicity 73.68% 0.00% 
Opportunity to get feedback on your work 73.68% 0.75% 
Potential for finding collaborators 72.18% 0.00% 
Normalizing understanding in a field 69.92% 0.00% 
The topic is receiving a lot of attention 67.67% 3.76% 
The number of requests you receive for the data 58.65% 3.01% 
Conforming with requirements of the scientific method 58.65% 3.01% 
Being first to release data in this area 56.39% 3.01% 
Conforming with the usual practices of the research community 50.38% 6.77% 
Potential to close a line of inquiry and move research to next step 48.87% 3.01% 
Impact on future grant applications 48.12% 3.01% 
Required by research funders 45.45% 1.52% 
Requirement for publication 43.94% 3.03% 
Whether you put in a large amount of work building the dataset 34.33% 24.63% 
Availability of other data that might substitute for your own 24.63% 14.93% 
Dealing with questions from users about the data 20.30% 33.83% 
Whether there is intense competition in the topic 19.55% 24.81% 
Legal barriers, such as copyright 10.47% 40.70% 
The time it takes to clean up and document for release 8.27% 55.64% 
Technical limitations, ie. webspace platform space constraints 6.02% 27.82% 
Time to verify privacy or other administrative data concerns 6.02% 39.10% 
The potential loss of future publications using this data 5.22% 35.82% 
The possibility that your data may be used without citation 3.01% 43.61% 
Competitors may get an advantage 2.24% 34.33% 
 
                                                
21 As in the case for code, the proportion of respondents citing each factors as an influential reason to 
share was significantly different from that citing it as a reason not to share, at the 5% level, with the 
exception of “Whether you put in a large amount of work building the dataset,” “Whether there is intense 
competition in the topic” and “Availability of other data that might substitute for your own” (p = 0.1079). 
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Table 8: Comparing Reasons or Sharing Code to Reasons Not to Share22 




Encouraging scientific advancement 91.11% 0.00% 
Encouraging sharing and having others share with you 89.63% 0.00% 
Being a good community member 86.67% 0.00% 
Increase in publicity 85.19% 0.74% 
Improvement in the caliber of research 84.44% 0.00% 
The potential to set a standard for the field 82.22% 1.48% 
Potential to encourage others to work on the problem 81.48% 1.48% 
Opportunity to get feedback on your work 77.78% 0.74% 
Potential for finding collaborators 71.85% 1.48% 
The topic is receiving a lot of attention 71.11% 0.74% 
The number of requests you receive for the code 67.41% 4.44% 
Normalizing understanding in a field 66.67% 0.00% 
Being first to release code in this area 64.44% 0.00% 
Conforming with requirements of the scientific method 61.48% 1.48% 
Conforming with the usual practices of the research community 58.52% 1.48% 
Impact on future grant applications 51.11% 4.44% 
Potential to close a line of inquiry and move research to next step 46.67% 0.74% 
Whether you put in a large amount of work building the code 44.44% 20.00% 
Requirement for publication 44.03% 2.24% 
Required by research funders 43.28% 1.49% 
Whether there is intense competition in the topic 28.89% 17.04% 
Availability of other code that might substitute for your own 25.37% 21.64% 
Dealing with questions from users about the code 18.52% 51.85% 
The code might be used in commercial applications 16.30% 28.15% 
The time it takes to clean up and document for release 8.89% 77.78% 
The possibility of patents or other IP constraints 8.15% 40.00% 
Legal barriers, such as copyright 5.81% 33.72% 
The potential loss of future publications using this code 5.19% 31.11% 
The possibility that your code may be used without citation 3.73% 44.78% 
Technical limitations, ie. webspace platform space constraints               3.70% 20.00% 
Competitors may get an advantage 2.22% 31.85% 
 
This provides evidence that Hypothesis 1 is violated: computational scientists’ reasons 
not to share their code and data do seem to arise from private concerns, but their reasons 
to share are grounded in a communitarian sense. “Dealing with questions from users 
about the code” is the second most cited reason for now sharing, after the time it takes to 
                                                
22 For each factor, the proportion citing it as an influence to share was significantly different from the 
proportion citing it as an influence not to share at the 5% level, as measured by a difference in proportions 
test., with the exception of “Availability of other code that might substitute for your own.” 
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clean up and document.23 It seems appropriate to label this the “Newton Effect” for its 
parallel in science history: After Newton published his first scientific paper in 
Philosophical Transactions24 he was so inundated with questions from members of the 
Royal Society, it also became his last journal article.25 (Willinsky 2005, chapter 13, 
p198). 
 
Table 9: Top Reasons Not to Share Data 
 Not Share  
The time it takes to clean up and document for release 55.64% 
The possibility that your data may be used without citation 43.61% 
Legal barriers, such as copyright 40.70% 
Time to verify privacy or other administrative data concerns 39.10% 
The potential loss of future publications using this data 35.82% 
Competitors may get an advantage 34.33% 
Dealing with questions from users about the data 33.83% 
Technical limitations, ie. webspace platform space constraints 27.82% 
Whether there is intense competition in the topic 24.81% 
Whether you put in a large amount of work building the dataset 24.63% 
Availability of other data that might substitute for your own 14.93% 
 
 
Table 10: Top Reasons Not to Share Code 
  Not Share 
The time it takes to clean up and document for release 77.78% 
Dealing with questions from users about the code 51.85% 
The possibility that your code may be used without citation 44.78% 
The possibility of patents or other IP constraints 40.00% 
Legal barriers, such as copyright 33.72% 
Competitors may get an advantage 31.85% 
The potential loss of future publications using this code 31.11% 
The code might be used in commercial applications 28.15% 
Availability of other code that might substitute for your own 21.64% 
Whether you put in a large amount of work building the code 20.00% 
Technical limitations, ie. webspace platform space constraints               20.00% 
                                                
23 “Dealing with questions from users about the data” is the seventh most highly cited reason not to 
share data. 
24 This was also the first substantive scientific paper published in the Transactions, Thomas Kuhn 
(1978, 27) cited in Willinsky p 200. 
25 “the publication of this letter proved to be a more open and immediate forum for his work than Newton 
was willing to bear, and he did not again use the journal to publish his experimental pursuits but relied 
exclusively on the unhurried book, most notably with the Principia, published fifteen years later in 1687.” 
Willinsky p200. This firestorm of exchange seems to have lead to the creation of the blind review process. 
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Whether there is intense competition in the topic 17.04% 
 
 “Table 9: Top Reasons Not to Share Data” and “Table 10: Top Reasons Not to 
Share Code” show the top reasons why respondents hold back on releasing their code and 
data. For both, the far and away biggest reason is the time it takes to prepare each for 
public release. As one respondent comments, “Not wanting to clean up, document and 
support the code is an incredibly strong influence not to reveal.  It eclipses the other 
pros and cons so much that you can consider my answer on that line to be on a log 
scale.” This is interesting because it speaks to an incentive misalignment in the reward 
structure for scientific research. There are many aspects of research which are tedious and 
time consuming, yet they get done when the expectations and reward structures are in 
place. This suggests a strong need to account for code and data release directly in the 
research review process. It seems change could occur on many levels, from policy set by 
University presidents, grant requirements, to validation in peer review and reward in 
promotion and award selection committees. Fear of use without proper citation ranked 
second for data and third for code. The “Newton effect” ranked second for code and 
seventh for data, implying data that is released tends to be perceived as reusable by 
others, more so than code. This implies an interesting phenomena, that perhaps 
researchers largely write their code in house and are more likely to use others’ data. As 
one respondent noted, 
 
Unlike data, people seem eager to write code. What amazes 
me is how many people write code that already exists. I 
have written nearly a hundred software tools in my field. 
All of the software is professionally written, carefully 
engineered for portability, with copious internal 
documentation and superb complete user documentation. Yet 
the tools are *underutilized*. Instead, people re-write the 
same functions over and over with bad documentation, bugs, 
etc. I conclude that writing software is more fun than 
collecting data, and students would much rather write 
software from scratch rather than spend a little time 
learning to use existing research software.  Ironically, 
people seem to hate collecting data. There is an asymmetry 
here: people seem more eager to share software than data, 
and they enjoy writing software more than collecting data. 
 
 It is also interesting to note the block to data and code sharing that the intellectual 
property structure instills is very real: ranking as the third most influential reason not to 
share data and the fourth and fifth most influential reasons not to share code. In fact, the 
use of the phrase copyright is something of a misnomer in describing the IP structure for 
raw facts, that are not copyrightable.26 Unfortunately this factor is ambiguous. Scientists 
may find copyright a real block to sharing data, which is a misunderstanding of copyright 
law, or they may simply be stating that there are real legal blocks to data sharing other 
than copyright. Verifying administrative restrictions on the data, such as privacy, ranks 
                                                
26 See Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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under legal restrictions. For both code and data, concern over the loss of future 
publications and giving competitors an advantage influenced approximately the same 
proportion of respondents – about 35% for data and 31% for code. What is interesting to 
note is that although concern over loss of a publication stream to others is an influential 
reason not to share, it pales when compared to the top reason, time for preparation for 
release. Researchers are simply much more concerned about spending their time 
preparing the auxiliary components of their work than they are about being scooped.  
Intense competition and the amount of work put into building the data were also 
important factors. That computational researchers recognize a “sweat of the brow” 
property right in data was also evident in the interviews. The availability of similar code 
stopped scientists from releasing their own, as it did with data, but to a lesser extent. 
 Actual code and data sharing behavior was obtained from direct inspection of 
each respondent’s website. If any code or data was posted on the respondent’s website, he 
or she was classified as “open,” and if no code or data was posted the respondent was 
classified as “closed.” This gave 44 open respondents and 90 closed, or 33% open and 
67% closed. A full 81% and 84% of respondents self-reported revealing a nonzero 
amount of code and data on the web, respectively. The discrepancy can perhaps be 
explained in that I only examined the respondent’s webpage for code and data, and if he 
or she was revealing through a co-author’s page, a central repository, or a lab page for 
example, these components of the research would not be included in my count. Using a 
central repository or lab webpage to share data and code is not uncommon, especially in 
biological sciences. 
 Several respondents went to great lengths to share code and data on their 
websites. Of these top sharers, typically code packages are introduced on a separate page 
within their website and tend to be more general than an association with a single paper. 
Links to data files may be with the link to the published paper, or on a separate page 
within the site. These top sharers generally reported, similarly to the entire sample, that 
time to prepare the code and data for release was a negative factor in their decision to 
share. The very top sharers tended to have webpages that included information on their 
scientific philosophy, possibly even about the sharing of code and data and 
reproducibility in computational science. One top sharer used http://www.github.com to 
track code changes and share code publicly. 
 Since respondents can be divided into open and closed groups, analysis on the 
importance of factors underlying each group’s sharing decision can be carried out. 
Examining the reasons both sharers and nonsharers choose not to reveal their work is 
instructive: respondents who do not reveal their code and data cite concerns about 
attribution and tracking subsequent data use. In this case, it is not unexpected that 
respondents cite primarily private incentives are influencing them, since the data in the 
tables is for the decision not to share. 
 Between the Open and Closed groups, significant differences in factor influence 
were found in concerns about dataset citation and use tracking. Those who do not reveal 
data or code on their website appear to have a different perception of the risks of not 
being given appropriate credit than those who do.27 
                                                
27 See http://www.stanford.edu/~vcs/Survey2009/CodeAppendix.txt for code used in generating these 
p-values. 
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Table 11: Most Influential Reasons Not to Share Data, by Non-sharer and Sharer 
 Closed Open p-value 
for diff 
The time it takes to document for release 
The possibility that your dataset may be used without citation 
Legal barriers, such as copyright 
The potential loss of future publications using these data 
Dealing with questions from users about the data 
The time it takes to verify privacy or other admin data concerns 
Competitors may get an advantage 
The web doesn’t allow me to track others use of the data 
Technical limitations, ie. webspace platform space constraints 
Whether there is intense competition in the topic 
Whether you put in a large amount of work building the dataset 








































Table 12: Most Influential Reasons Not to Share Code, by Non-Sharer and Sharer 
 Closed Open p-value 
for diff 
The time it takes to clean up and document for release 
Dealing with questions from users about the code 
The possibility that your code may be used without citation 
The possibility of patents, or other IP constraints 
Competitors may get an advantage 
The potential loss of future publications using this code 
The code might be used in commercial applications 
Legal barriers, such as copyright 
The web doesn’t allow me to track others use of the code 
Technical limitations, ie. webspace platform space constraints 
Availability of other code that might substitute for your own 
Whether you put in a large amount of work building the code 











































One question on the survey asked respondents to estimate the number of papers, if any, 
they feel they have had scooped. “Table 13: Idea Scooping (reported in the Survey)” 
gives the results: a majority of scientists who answered the survey felt they had had at 
least one paper scooped. 
Table 13: Idea Scooping (reported in the Survey) 
Idea Scooping Count Proportion 
 At least one publication scooped 
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 No ideas stolen  50 0.49 
 
This points to a seemingly pervasive problem in sharing of code and data: the perceived 
risk of losing subsequent publications and inadequate citation. 
 Hypothesis 2 can be evaluated by measuring the strength of influence of both the 
desire for community membership and the desire for feedback. Three factors address this: 
“Opportunity to get feedback on your work,” “Being a good community member,” and 
“Encouraging sharing and having others share with you.” 











Being a good community member 80.45% 0.00% 86.67% 0.00% 
Encouraging sharing and having others share with you 78.95% 0.00% 89.63% 0.00% 
Opportunity to get feedback on your work 73.68% 0.75% 77.78% 0.74% 
 
These three factors are significantly in their effect on the decision to share compared to 
the decision not to share, for both code and data, and the influence of all three is 
significantly different from zero. The real question seems to be whether these are the 
primary reasons for sharing compared to the other factors. Once again, I can use the 
bootstrap to find the likelihood of observing this particular ranking of factors if we expect 
all factors to be equally distributed. The high ranking we do observe is significant at the 
12% level for both code and data, providing support that these three factors are unusually 
highly ranked as observed in the survey response. It does appear that “Opportunity to get 
feedback on your work,” “Being a good community member,” and “Encouraging sharing 
and having others share with you” are predominantly important factors underlying the 
decision to share code and data, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
 Using the previous classification respondents as open or closed (whether any code 
or data appears on the respondent’s website) I used a regression model to understand the 
predictive ability of the covariates. Using University Ranking, Department, whether the 
respondent is in the Life Science, Gender, and Position a logistic model was fit. 
University Ranking is on a 0 to 4 scale, based on the U.S. News and World Reports 2008 
Ranking as described earlier, binary variables for gender (1 for female, 0 for male) and 
life sciences (1 for life science, 0 otherwise), and Position is on a 0 to 5 scale from 
Master’s Student to Full Professor. Department indicates whether the respondent is in a 
more computational department (CS, EE, physics, statistics, computational biology, 
medical imaging, bioinformatics, psychology, organizational research) or a less 
computational department (music, philosophy, medicine, biology, mathematics). 
“Department” is 1 for less computational and 0 for the more computational. 
 “Table 15: Logistic Regression Results” gives the parameter estimates for the 
fitted logistic model. Position is a significant predictor of sharing of code and data, with a 
higher position indicating a higher likelihood the respondent will be open. Whether the 
respondent is in a more computational department indicates he or she is more likely to be 
open. Gender, working in the life sciences, and university ranking do not correlate with 
propensity to be open. 
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Table 15: Logistic Regression Results 
 Estimate P-value 
(Intercept)  -1.21607 0.0099 
University  -0.04654 0.7018 
Department  -1.33245 0.1089 
LifeSciences  -0.07585 0.8700 
Position   0.29609 0.0373 
Gender   0.29625 0.6435 
 
The significance at the 10% level of the level of computational of respondent’s 
department may simply be an artifact of those in more computational departments having 
more data and code to share. The significance of the Position variable supports Polanyi 
and von Krogh’s postulation of scientists as a community of revealers. If their assertion is 
so, we would expect the more established within the community to be those more likely 
to reveal. These results show the propensity to reveal, among the machine learning 
community, increases significantly with seniority of status. Predicting only whether or 
not some code was shared increased the significance level of Position to a p-value of 
0.0258 and a parameter estimate of 0.3294, and the department’s level of computation 
increased significance to a p-value of 0.0608 with a parameter estimate of -2.0463. These 
results strengthen the conclusions of the overall regression in predicting openness 
generally, since the signs of the coefficient estimates are the same and the magnitude has 
increased. 
D.  Design Shortcomings 
 
 Statistical analysis of the survey responses shows that, contrary to previous 
literature, scientists’ reasons for sharing their code and data are largely communitarian in 
nature, whereas their concerns when not sharing reflect more immediate personal 
consequences. But how are we to know that this isn’t simply scientists saying what they 
feel is the appropriate thing to say, in line with the well-known Mertonian norms, rather 
than what they really think? It is well known in survey analysis that asking people about 
behavior that is seen as against norm, can induce the respondent to be reluctant to admit 
such behavior. There is no way to know definitively that these survey responses reflect 
the true considerations computational scientists take into account when making a decision 
but several safeguards point to the veracity of respondents. First, the survey asked about a 
particular decision they had taken, the sharing made with respect to their last NIPS 
publication, and if that paper was not computational, then their last published 
computational paper. Giving a specific reference point, consistent across all respondents, 
maximized not only comparability in respondents’ answers but the most likelihood to 
penetrate to the rationale behind the actual sharing behavior. (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981). Second, there is evidence that suggests scientists are not giving their behavior a 
Mertonian gloss: the revealers are claiming communitarian norms, rather than Mertonian 
norms, as their basis for revealing. Third, the survey itself made every effort not to 
communicate a bias toward Mertonian norms. Over 80% of respondents indicated they 
did share code or data, indicating, if true, their behavior is largely in line with Mertonian 
norms before being questioned. When the analysis was reduced to two groups, those 
whom I found evidence of sharing or not sharing on their website, the same results held.  
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As Christine Borgman states in her recent book, the very neatness of Mertonian norms 
tends “to oversimplify the mechanisms of scholarship. Much of the subsequent social 
studies of science literature takes a more constructionist perspective, finding scientists 
may state norms as a convenient shorthand to explain themselves, but in fact, their 
practices are local and vary widely.” (2007: p37). 
 That fully 81% and 84% of respondents indicated they shared code or data raises 
concern about respondent bias. A number of respondents prefaced their response with a 
statement indicating their interest in this topic, and frequently request a copy of the paper 
that results from this work.28 This type of indicates that researchers sympathetic to 
openness and reproducibility, a priori, are more likely to reply. Of final survey 
respondents who answered the question, 89% requested I send them a copy of the final 
paper resulting from this research. Having presented at NIPS myself in 2003, I received a 
small number of replies to the pilots from researchers who remembered my talk or 
remembered meeting me. This may improve response rates in that researchers might be 
more likely to respond to someone they recognize as in the Machine Learning 
community, and so long as their mental association is not with reproducibility (my NIPS 




 This paper does two things. It provides evidence in the debate about whether 
scientists’ research revealing behavior is wholly governed by considerations of personal 
impact or whether the reasoning behind the revealing decision involves larger scientific 
ideals, and secondly, this research describes the actual sharing behavior in the Machine 
Learning community. As measured by my analysis of code and data posting on 
respondents’ webpages, about 30% of computational scientists in Machine Learning post 
some code or some data on their own site.29 Only a handful of respondents made 
comprehensive posting of code and data used in their work readily and easily available 
through their website. David’s aforementioned “trials of verification” are not 
systematically taking place. (2003: p3).  
 In the survey scientists indicate that the closing of black boxes as a method of 
resolving disputes is not a compelling reason not to share as only 3% or respondents cited 
it as a reason not to share data, and 1% for code. If anything, it appears that transparency 
in research is actually viewed as way to settle scientific disputes, with 49% of 
respondents saying the “Potential to close a line of inquiry and move research to next 
step” influenced them to share their data, and 47% indicating the same for code, although 
                                                
28 The two pilots were communicated via email with no link to a webform, so sending an email back to me 
was the only way to answer the survey questions. When I gave recipients the option of using a webform on 
the final survey, without exception every respondent opted to use the webform, rather than email me their 
response, and the personalized reply dropped to a couple.  
 
29 As mentioned previously, this percentage doesn’t include data or code deposited in repositories not 
linked to from the respondent’s website. Nor does it include publicly available data corpora or repositories 
associated with journals that may be well referenced in the text of the published paper. Because of this, the 
30% figure must be considered a lower bound for the general level of revealing of code and data, although 
it is an appropriate measure for  final survey respondents’ revealing of code and data publicly on their 
website. 
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this factor did not rank particularly highly (16th most influential for data of 34, and 17th 
of 35 factors for code) in influence on the decision to reveal.  
 Generalized reciprocity is highly cited as a reason to share code and data (2nd and 
4th ranked for code and data respectively). As a respondent stated, “what goes around 
comes around.” This finding lends support to the generalization of Ekeh and Bouty’s 
work in free revealing in industry to the scientific context. Another respondent notes, 
“Much of my research would have not been possible if other people had 
not released their data or code. This is one of the main reasons for 
which I also want to contribute by releasing my own data and code” and 
another respondent cites knowing that the effort to release can save time for others: “Once 
you've spent time solving a problem, it softens the pain a little to 
think that others can benefit from it.” 
 The potential to set a standard in a research area ranked 5th for data and 6th for 
code. This suggests the generalization of similar results found by von Hippel and Harhoff 
in the setting with free revealing of proprietary information by firms. von Hippel (1986) 
models the sharing and trading of proprietary information by rival (and non-rival) firms 
as a prisoner’s dilemma. He finds underlying conditions that determine when 
participating in this information trading game makes economic sense. Although von 
Hippel describes a situation in which engineers within firms trade information between 
each other rather than making the information publicly available in published form, and I 
am studying for the case in computational scientific research revealed publicly on the 
web, my results are supportive of his in two important ways.30 von Hippel (1986:11) 
observes situations when firms in direct competition nonetheless engage in information 
sharing. Two conditions exist for know-how trading by engineers: that the traded 
information is not vital to the firm, and that is could be independently developed by other 
firms if necessarily. These factors imply the highest competitive advantage information is 
not traded. This is supported in the research on sharing between computational scientists, 
in that scientists do not seem particularly worried about the intensity of competition when 
they chose not to share their code and data. The factor on the survey “Whether there is 
intense competition in the topic” ranked as the 8th highest reason not to share data and 
the 12th for code (25% of respondents for data and 17% for code). Maintaining a 
competitive advantage is cited at the sixth highest reason for not sharing code and data 
(32% and 34% of respondents cited it as a reason for not sharing code or data, 
respectively). von Hippel bases his model of personal proprietary information trading on 
the notion of reciprocity. As pointed out in von Hippel’s paper, “Collins (1982) has 
shown that scientists employed by non-profit laboratories (university and governmental) 
selectively revealed data to colleagues interested in know-how related to the "TEA 
laser".” Collins notes that individuals and laboratories make conscious and careful 
discriminations as to what know-how would be revealed to what recipient, and noted also 
that “"[n]early every laboratory expressed a preference for giving information only to 
those who had something to return."(Collins 1982:59)” (von Hippel 1986:27). The 
                                                
30 Von Hippel’s paper also investigates whether the know-how is in fact valuable. I am assuming 
throughout this study that code and data are valuable to other researchers. It seems clear this is the case for 
data and at least some code (e.g. WaveLab and SparseLab), but as a survey respondent pointed out 
researcher seem to like to recode anew rather than adapt preexisting code. Investigating this assumption is 
an area for future research: to what extent is science remixed? Regardless, scientific principle of 
reproducibility and verification demand openness in data and methods. 
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conditions von Hippel gives for a prisoner’s dilemma exist in the scientific context as 
well: there is a temptation to “defect” each round (ie. not share code and data upon 
publication) and the gains are maximized if each researcher shares his or her code with 
every publication. 
 A number of factors were included in the survey to ascertain the constraints 
inhibiting sharing that scientists perceive due to the Intellectual Property framework. 
When citing reasons not to share data and code, the top of the list of factors preventing 
the sharing of data was time to prepare for release (cited by 56% percent of respondents) 
and concern over lack of citation in downstream use (44%), then legal barriers such as 
copyright (41%). The story is similar for code: the top reason for not sharing is time to 
prepare (78%), then dealing with questions from users (52%), concerns over use without 
citation (45%), and third the possibility of patents or other IP constraints (40%) and legal 
barriers such as copyright (32%). This indicated the IP framework is having a deleterious 




The traditional mechanism for the communication of new scientific discoveries 
has been through publishing a research paper in a journal. But the Internet has changed 
this: not only are papers available to researchers much more quickly, but scientists are not 
limited to sharing only the aspects of their work that lend themselves to a journal’s 
format. Now scientists routinely share preprints, published papers, and other forms of 
traditional scientific knowledge transmission mechanisms, but they also share entirely 
new forms such as datasets, code, high resolution images, software designed to entail the 
manipulation of results by others, links and lists of related works. This facility can make 
the black boxes significantly easier to open. 
 Scholars can concerned about the creation of derivative works from their writing, 
specifically by someone who uses large chunks of their work to recontextualize and 
distort their ideas. I don’t think this is so much of a problem in an objective field where 
code verifies the work, but it might be worth asking. 
Keeping a secret can be costly. Innovators may choose not to protect their 
product, through either patenting, trade secrets, or trademarking, because the cost of 
doing so outweighs the potential profit (Harhoff et al. 2003). In the sciences it is not 
typical to reveal work before publication implying a need for a window of protection 
while ideas develop in preparation for public exposure. Patent law provides a window of 
protection to inventors in exchange for disclosure, and so is structured to create 
incentives both for knowledge to be revealed and the gains reaped by inventors, thus 
internalizing the benefits accruing to research and development. A patent grants a limited 
term exclusive right to the invention to the inventor, in exchange for openly revealing the 
knowledge. Landes and Posner (2003) give an incentives explanation for the rationale 
behind patent law.: As costs of inventing around and defending an infringement lawsuit 
increase, the patent becomes more valuable and thus the inventor becomes more likely to 
seek a patent. 
There is an analogy to the production of scientific research: just as inventors are 
thought to require certain limited monopoly rights to encourage their inventing behavior, 
so scientists may find a window of proprietary rights over their work encourages further 
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scientific discoveries. It is plausible that with the Internet’s facilitation of rendering 
Latour’s black boxes transparent, scientists may seek other ways to keep them closed and 
thereby maintain their lead over other scientists. This analogy ends with the incentives to 
invent around and push the limits of noninfringement. In scientific research the idea must 
be attributed but there is little need on the part of the discoverer for exclusive use of the 
idea once it has been attributed to him or her, in fact this is counter to the Mertonian 
norms described previously. Note that there is no need for a limited term, as in the case of 
patents, because academic scientific research is intended to be open and usable by its 
very nature, at least by other researchers. Scientific research is quality filtered not by a 
central office, as in the case of patents, but by a diffuse network of journals and 
reputation mechanisms. Of course fundamental, usually scientific, ideas cannot be 
patented but even if the analogy to patents is not apt, researchers can reveal their work in 
such a way that it is difficult for fellow researchers to follow. Such obfuscation does 
occur in patent applications: the invention is revealed but there is an incentive for the 
inventor to reveal as little as possible, making it harder for his or her work to be used, 
thus collecting more return on the investment and incurring less risk of defending the 
patent. Because a similar incentive mechanism is operating – scientists may wish to 
conceal the details of their work from competitors, yet still appear superficially to be 
revealing – policy makers must use a delicate hand in mandating revealing in scientific 
research. 
There is a vibrant culture around the sharing of artistic works, especially digital 
ones such as images, music and film. The Free Culture movement seeks to facilitate this 
sharing and mobilize artistic creation. This view of cultural creation, based at core on 
notions of remix, can be extended to include the process of scientific discovery and its 
addition to culture, thereby fleshing out the appropriate of the Free Culture arguments for 
scientific enterprise. 
 This work could also be verified in a second direction. Both Polanyi and von 
Krogh envision science as a community of revealers seeking feedback from peers. Thus 
we would expect free revealing scientists to be highly engaged members of their 
respective subfield. It would be interesting to test this hypothesis – preliminary 
investigation in this study reveals that more senior and engaged members do tend to 
reveal their work more, but controls are needed to understand whether this is due to years 
of experience, number of research assistants or other factors, if the effect is even real at 
all.  
 Computational science is a special case of scientific research: the work is easily 
shared via the Internet since the paper, code, and data are digital and those three aspects 
are all that is required to reproduce the results, given sufficient computation tools. It may 
be the case that the theory of scientist’s sharing incentives applies differently in non-
computational areas where tools and materials are less easily shared. A natural next step 
would be to examine the sharing behavior of other materials used in scientific research, 
for example wet lab materials, animals, and specimens (Murray 2009). 
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